Home' Policy Magazine : Policy Vol 30 - No 1 Contents ANDREW LEIGH
POLICY • Vol. 30 No. 1 • Autumn 2014
15 DIAC (Department of Immigration and Citizenship),
Australia's Migration Trends 2011--12 (Canberra:
DIAC, 2013. Note that this analysis ignores temporary
migrants, who are included in the measure of
net overseas migration. A full decomposition of net
overseas migration for the decade 2003–04 to 2012–13
is 26% permanent family, 52% permanent skilled,
7% permanent humanitarian, and 16% temporary
migration (percentages do not add to 100% due to
rounding). e rise in temporary migration is a feature
of the shift in migration policy over the recent years,
and makes the Australian migration system more
susceptible to changes in labour demand.
16 This is based on data for family and skilled visa
migrants in wave three of the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Australia, weighted by the share of each.
17 Ralph Lattimore and Clinton Pobke, Recent Trends
in Australian Fertility, Productivity Commission Staff
Working Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia,
2008), cited in Ross Guest, ‘The Economics of a
Sustainable Population’ (Canberra: Parliamentary
Library, 23 November 2010). Guest points out that
the Australian Total Fertility Rate (TFR) rose by
14%, from 1.73 in 2001 to 1.97 in 2008, and cited
the estimates of Lattimore and Pobke that the effect
of Australia’s suite of family payment increases over
a similar period was between 2.5% and 3.7%.
18 Robert Drago, Katina Sawyer, Karina Sheffler, Diana
Warren, and Mark Wooden, Did Australia's Baby
Bonus Increase the Fertility Rate? Working Paper 1:09
(University of Melbourne: Melbourne Institute of
Applied Economic and Social Research, 2009); Ralph
Lattimore and Clinton Pobke, Recent Trends in Australian
Fertility, as above.
19 Murray Goot and Ian Watson, ‘Population, Immigration
and Asylum Seekers: Patterns in Australian Public
Opinion’ (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2011).
20 In what follows, I take it for granted that a larger population
means increased city populations, and a larger economy.
21 Cross-country regressions fnd little evidence that the
share of GDP devoted to defence falls as the population
rises, but some evidence that the share of GDP devoted
to government education spending falls as GDP rises.
However, it is difcult to imagine that this could apply
in the current Australian context. See Alberto Alesina and
Enrico Spolaore, e Size of Nations (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2005), chapter 10.
22 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and
Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton University Press, 2010),
21. Biddle also nds similarly disappointing results for
other factors. The country with the larger GNP won
625 of the time (N=13), the country with more military
personnel won 49% of the time (N=43), and the country
with more military spending won 57% of the time (N=35).
None of these differences is statistically significant at
the 90% level.
23 For example, Ross Garnaut has argued that the positive
scale effects on infrastructure and public services are
large enough to offset any negative wage effects of
immigration: Ross Garnaut, ‘Immigration: Who Wins
and Who Loses,’ in Migration: Benefiting Australia,
Conference Proceedings (Sydney: Department of
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Afairs,
7–8 May 2002), 131–164.
24 In 2012–13, the London underground made £33 million.
25 Harry Clarke, ‘Should Australia Target Its Population
Size?' Economic Papers 22:1 (2003), 24–35.
26 Another variant of the scale argument relates to the size
of the domestic market. If an entrepreneur is producing
a non-tradeable good or service, and a component of
her costs are fxed, she will be more likely to succeed if
the domestic market is larger. However, the increasing
flow of goods and services across borders means that
this argument applies to fewer and fewer start-ups.
27 Paul Collier, Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 117.
28 Kevin Chinnery and Anthony Sibillin, ‘Te Big Cost of
Small Australia,’ BRW (19–25 August 2010), 24.
29 Carolyn King, Who Brought the Luck to the Lucky Country?:
Great Australian Migrant Business (Red Dog Books, 2011).
30 David McKenzie, Steven Stillman, and John Gibson, ‘How
Important is selection? Experimental vs. Non‐Experimental
Measures of the Income Gains from Migration,’ Journal of
the European Economic Association 8:4 (2010). Te income
gain from moving is 263%, which is likely to be causal,
since the estimate is based on a lottery. See also Michael
A. Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett,
‘The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical
Workers Across the US Border,’ Working Paper No. 148
(Center for Global Development, 2008).
31 Quoted in Paul Collier, 2013, Exodus: How Migration is
Changing Our World, as above, 167.
32 Ed Glaeser, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest
Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier
and Happier (London: Penguin Books (Kindle edition),
33 Productivity Commission, ‘Submission to the Taskforce
on the Sustainable Population Strategy for Australia'
(Canberra: Productivity Commission, 2011), 29–30;
John Daley, 2012, ‘Critiquing government regional
development policies,’ in Jonathan Pincus and Graeme
Hugo (eds), A Greater Australia: Population, Policies
and Governance (Melbourne: Committee for Economic
Development of Australia (CEDA)), 212–222.
34 NSW Bureau of Transport Statistics, 2013, Bureau of
Transport Statistics 2011/12 Household Travel Survey
Summary Report, 2013 Release, (Sydney: BTS), tables 2.1
35 See National Housing Supply Council, 2012, Housing
Supply and A ordability---Key Indicators, 2012, (Canberra:
Australian Treasury), 22.
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