Home' Policy Magazine : Policy Vol 32 - No 3 Contents 35
POLICY • Vol. 32 No. 3 • Spring 2016
19 Barrie Dunstan, ‘Strategist Makes Good Case for Higher
Guarantee Rate’, Australian Financial Review (8 August
2008), p. 67.
20 As argued by Bernie Fraser on ABC Radio National
Breakfast (10 September 2014), available from http://www.
21 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission
to Senate Economics Committee Inquiry Into Minerals
Resource Rent Tax Bill 2011, Submission 14 (2011), pp.
22 Seamus McGuinness, John Freebairn and Kostas
Mavromaras, Characteristics of Minimum Wage Employees,
Research Report No. 2/07 (Melbourne Institute of Applied
Economic and Social Research, July 2007).
23 For example, Marcia Keegan and Laurie Brown, ‘Impact
of the Increase in the Superannuation Guarantee on Wage
Costs in the Health Sector’, Australian Labour Market
Research Workshop (Canberra: National Centre for Social
and Economic Modelling, 29-30 November 2012).
24 This is explained in more detail in John Freebairn, ‘Some
Long-Run Labour Market Effects of the Superannuation
Guarantee’, Australian Economic Review 37:2 (January
2004), pp. 191-97.
25 Sandra Dandie and Joseph Mercante, ‘Australian Labour
Supply Elasticities: Comparison and Critical Review’,
Treasury Working Paper 2007-04 (October 2007); and
Bob Breunig, Deborah Cobb-Clark and Xiaodong Gong,
‘Improving the Modelling of Couples’ Labour Supply’,
Economic Record 84:267 (December 2008), pp. 466-485.
26 Freebairn, ‘Some Long-Run Labour Market Effects of
the Superannuation Guarantee’ (see note 24). See also
Productivity Commission, An Ageing Australia: Preparing
for the Future, Productivity Commission Research Paper
(November 2013), p. 179.
27 Ken Henry et al, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement
Income Strategic Issues Paper (2009), Section 2.
28 Table 5, page 297 of Malcolm Edey and Luke Gower,
‘National Saving: Trends and Policy’ in The Australian
Economy in the 1990s, eds. David Gruen and Shona
Shrestha, Proceedings of a Conference (Sydney: Reserve
Bank of Australia, Economic Group, 2000).
29 For instance see George Rothman, The Adequacy of
Australian Retirement Incomes—New Estimates Incorporating
The Better Super Reforms, Paper presented to the Fifteenth
Colloquium of Superannuation Researchers (July 2007).
The paper also critiques some of the other studies with
30 John Daley, Brendan Coates and Danielle Wood, Super Tax
Targeting (Grattan Institute, 2015), section 3.3.
31 Cited in Kirchner, Compulsory Super At 20 (see note 2),
32 See Kirchner, as above, p. 17; and Daley, Coates and Wood,
Super Tax Targeting.
33 See David Ingles and Miranda Stewart, ‘Why Pensioners
Are Cruising Their Way Around Budget Changes’ ,
The Conversation (June 2015); and Rafal Chomik and
John Piggott, ‘A Note on the Treatment of Assets in
the Australian Age Pension Means Test’, ARC Centre of
Excellence in Population Ageing Research Working Paper
2016/01 (February 2016).
34 Kirchner, Compulsory Super at 20 (see note 2), p. 18.
35 Matthew Taylor and Simon Cowan, The Age Old Problem
of Old Age: Fixing the Pension, Research Report 3, (Sydney:
The Centre for Independent Studies, May 2015).
36 As proposed by the 2009 Henry Tax Review (Ken Henry
et al, Australia’s Future Tax System: Final Report, Part 5);
by Stephen Kirchner, Compulsory Super at 20 (see note
2); by Simon Cowan, The Myths of the Generational
Bargain, Research Report 10 (Sydney: The Centre for
Independent Studies, March 2016); and by the Productivity
Commission, An Ageing Australia (see note 26), p. 201.
37 As proposed by Kirchner, Compulsory Super At 20 (see note
2), p.23, as well as Hazel Bateman and Geoffrey Kingston
‘The Henry Review and Super and Saving’, The Australian
Economic Review 43:4 (December 2010), pp. 437-48.
38 Cited in Kirchner, Compulsory Super At 20, (see note 2),
39 Joe Hockey, Financial System Inquiry Final Report
(November 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-
40 Particularly because superannuation savings can’t be
withdrawn. With other forms of saving, if the saver doesn’t
like policy changes they can move their savings elsewhere.
This option is largely not available for superannuation. See
Kirchner, Compulsory Super At 20, (see note 2), p. 19.
41 Financial Services Council, ‘45th Parliament Must End
Traffic-Jam of Reform and Stem Costs to Consumers’, press
release (20 July 2016).
42 Alan Goldberg, Jeremy Cooper, Ross Jones, Elana Rubin
and Steve Tucker, A Super Charter: Few Changes, Better
Outcomes, A Report to the Treasurer and Minister Assisting
for Financial Services and Superannuation (Commonwealth
of Australia, 2013), chapter 2. See also David Gruen
and Leigh Soding, ‘Compulsory Superannuation and
National Saving’, Economic Roundup, Issue 3 (Australian
Government the Treasury, October 2011).
43 The OECD definition of a tax is ‘a compulsory unrequited
payment to the government’. See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
44 The OECD argues that payments like the SG either increase
employer labour costs or reduce wages in a similar way to
taxes. See OECD, Taxing Wages 2008-2009 Special Feature:
Non-tax Compulsory Payments as an Additional Burden on
Labour Income (2010), p. 26. The OECD also argues (p. 29)
that it ‘will often not be relevant’ to business whether costs
are higher because of taxes on the one hand or payments
such as the SG on the other.
45 Treasury has argued that the government is likely to
increase other taxes to offset the lost taxes from the SG
increase. See David Gruen and Leigh Soding, ‘Compulsory
Superannuation and National Saving’ (see note 42).
46 Wayne Swan, Intergenerational Report (2010) and Joe
Hockey, Intergenerational Report (2015).
Links Archive Policy Vol 32 - No 2 Policy Vol 32 - No 4 Navigation Previous Page Next Page